SECOND SECTION
CASE OF SELAHATTİN DEMİRTAŞ v. TÜRKİYE
(Application no. 21321/21)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27 May 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Jovan Ilievski, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Anja Seibert-Fohr, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 21321/21) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 April 2021 by a Turkish national, Mr Selahattin Demirtaş (“the applicant”), who was born in 1973, is detained in Edirne and was represented by Mr M. Karaman, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Turkish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent at the time, Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, former Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to reject the Government’s objection to the examination of the application by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 6 May 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the rejection by the domestic courts of the compensation action brought by the applicant, who was a member of the National Assembly and the co-president of a political party at the relevant time, for the harm he had allegedly suffered due to certain social media posts.
2. On 19 August 2016 one of the advisors of the President of the Republic shared on his Twitter account a photo of the applicant with the President of the German Parliament and the co-president of a German political party, with the following comments: “Crypto refugee from the Palais Bellevue, his leash on his neck, trail of Germans, oh the degenerate slut”. He also shared another entry as follows: “While so many lives [are being lost] in our provinces and there are families who are [in immense sadness], [why] keep in the [National] Assembly these bastards who disguise themselves as MPs”.
3. On 25 October 2016 the applicant filed an action for damages with the Diyarbakır 6th Civil Court of First Instance on account of the above‑mentioned tweets. He claimed 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY) for the damage to his reputation he had allegedly suffered as a result of the social media posts in question.
4. On 23 March 2017 the civil court partially accepted the applicant’s claims and awarded him compensation in the amount of TRY 9,000. In doing so, the court found that the posts contained libellous expressions which were clearly directed at the applicant. Both parties appealed this decision.
5. On 2 June 2017 the Gaziantep Regional Appeal Court dismissed the applicant’s compensation claims. It found in this regard that it was not clear to whom the entry “Crypto refugee from the Palais Bellevue, his leash on his neck, trail of Germans, oh the degenerate slut” was addressed, considering that it was shared as a comment on a photo of the applicant with two other political figures. It further found that the post “While so many lives [are being lost] in our provinces and there are families who are [in immense sadness], [why] keep in the [National] Assembly these bastards who disguise themselves as MPs” was addressed to the applicant in the context of criticising his position concerning acts of terrorism in Türkiye at the time, and that as much as they appear to be disturbing and unpleasant, they fell within freedom of expression as the applicant had to tolerate harsh criticism as a well‑known political figure and the co-president of a political party.
6. On 14 July 2017 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court to complain of an alleged violation of his right to respect for private life due to the rejection of his action for compensation. On 15 October 2020 the Turkish Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s application inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded, concluding that there was no violation of the right to protect and develop one’s material and spiritual existence under Article 17 of the Constitution.
7. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant claimed that the national authorities had failed to protect his reputation against the alleged harm caused by the social media posts in question.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
8. The Government invited the Court to declare the application inadmissible, referring to the principle of subsidiarity and maintaining that the domestic courts had duly examined the applicant’s complaints in a manner compliant with the Court’s case-law.
9. The Court considers that the argument presented by the Government raises issues requiring an examination of the case on the merits and not an examination of the admissibility (see Tüzünataç v. Türkiye, no. 14852/18, § 20, 7 March 2023). Noting that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds, the Court declares it admissible.
10. The applicant argued that, by rejecting his claim for damages, the national authorities had failed to fulfil their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to protect his private life.
11. The Government alleged that the domestic courts had conducted a thorough analysis and explained in detail as to how they struck a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect for his reputation and the opposing party’s freedom of expression.
12. The Court recalls the relevant general principles in cases which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, which were summarized in Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France ([GC], no. 40454/07, §§ 82-93, ECHR 2015 (extracts), and Tarman v. Turkey, no. 63903/10, §§ 36-38, 21 November 2017).
13. The Court notes that in the present case, the applicant brought an action for compensation in respect of certain social media posts, alleging that they had damaged his reputation, and that this action was ultimately dismissed by the national courts.
14. The Court reiterates that, in assessing whether the national courts’ balancing of the applicant’s right to the protection of his reputation against the opposing party’s right to freedom of expression complied with the criteria laid down in its case-law (see Tarman, cited above, § 38), it must pay particular attention to the reasons given by the national courts (ibid., § 40).
15. The Court notes that in the present case, the Regional Appeal Court overturned the judgment of the Diyarbakır 6th Civil Court of First Instance and definitively dismissed the applicant’s action. The Regional Appeal Court held that the statements in the impugned social media posts were either not clearly addressed to the applicant or fell within the scope of the opposing party’s freedom of expression, as the applicant, a well-known political figure, had to tolerate disturbing or offensive statements levelled at him (see paragraph 5 above). As regards the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Court notes that it dismissed the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 with a brief inadmissibility decision using a standard text, without any more thorough assessment of the circumstances of the case at hand (see paragraph 6 above).
16. The Court observes that although the Regional Appeal Court briefly referred to one of the relevant criteria – the greater degree of tolerance to criticism expected from politicians – to take into account in the balancing exercise as laid down in the Court’s case-law, it appears that the domestic courts failed to properly strike a balance between the competing rights in the case at hand. Indeed, the reasoning of the domestic courts’ decisions do not provide a satisfactory answer to the question as to whether the freedom of expression of the author of the impugned social media posts could justify, in the present case, the alleged infringement of the applicant’s right to the protection of his reputation in view of the form and content of the disputed social media posts, which included a picture of the applicant with German politicians and expressions such as “degenerate slut” and “bastards” that could be perceived as offensive or insulting. The domestic authorities do not explain in their decisions whether the impugned expressions had a sufficient factual basis in the circumstances of the case. Neither do the domestic courts’ decisions demonstrate that they carried out an adequate assessment taking into account all the relevant criteria in the balancing exercise, in particular, the contribution of the posts to a debate of public interest; the subject of the social media posts; the prior conduct of the applicant; the content, form and consequences of the posts.
17. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, the national authorities cannot be considered to have balanced the interests at stake in accordance with the criteria established by its case law and accordingly failed to comply with their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.
18. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
19. The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, EUR 233 in respect of costs and expenses and EUR 6,520 in respect of the legal fees based on a time sheet drawn up by his lawyers. The applicant submitted invoices for the legal fees as well as the contract between him and his lawyers.
20. The Government contested the applicant’s claims as being unsubstantiated and excessive.
21. The Court awards the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. As regards the costs and expenses, and having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 500, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 May 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski
Deputy Registrar President