FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 5627/22
DOPRAVNÍ ROZVOJOVÉ STŘEDISKO ČR A.S.
against the Czech Republic
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 21 November 2024 as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Gilberto Felici,
Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 5627/22) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 January 2022 by a Czech company, Dopravní rozvojové středisko ČR a.s. (“the applicant company”), registered in Prague, which was represented by Mr L. Koudele, a lawyer practising in Prague;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Czech Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the restriction of the applicant company’s ownership rights by its obligation to tolerate, free of charge, the operation of a publicly accessible purpose-built road on a plot of land which the applicant company acquired in a public auction sale. The applicant company relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. In 2002 the applicant company acquired several plots of land in a public auction sale from a state enterprise in liquidation. The auction report stated that the property was not burdened with any liabilities. The property, which an expert had valued at 9,129,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (298,300 euros (EUR) at that time), was auctioned to the applicant for CZK 490,000 (EUR 16,011 at that time). The plot of land concerned measured 5,873 m². Satellite imagery showed that there had been a visible road running across the land in question since at least 1974.
3. In October 2016 the applicant company requested an assessment of the nature of the road concerned, for the purposes of applying for permission to fence the land in question.
4. In March 2017 the Prague 15 Municipal Office decided that the road, measuring 18 metres long and 5,7 metres wide, having existed since the 1970s, was a publicly accessible purpose-built road (veřejně přístupná účelová komunikace) pursuant to sections 7(1) and 19(1) of Law no. 13/1997 on terrestrial communications. It held, in particular, that there were no alternative means of accessing the neighbouring lands and that the applicant, or its predecessor in title, had implicitly consented to public use of the road.
5. This decision was subsequently confirmed by the Prague Municipality which held, in particular, that:
“... If, in the past, when the land began to be used as a purpose-built road, [its] owner did not express qualified opposition to this, it is a purpose-built road established by law. It is sufficient for the owner to tolerate the use of the land as a road, but an owner who objects must take active steps. Once a purpose-built road is established, its legal status remains binding for future owners of the land – purpose-built road, and they are not entitled to close the road of their own free will... .”
6. Accordingly, it was established that the part of the land corresponding to the purpose-built road was subject to public use and could not be fenced off by the applicant company.
7. In December 2018 the applicant company brought an action for unjust enrichment against the Prague – Štěrboholy District seeking the payment of CZK 4,975, later increased to CZK 15,094 (EUR 582 at that time) regarding the periods from 1 January 2016 to 28 February 2016 and from 1 November 2017 to 28 February 2018[1]. It contended that it had never consented to its land to be used as a purpose-built road and that it should have been compensated for the forced restriction of ownership equalling to the amount that would have been paid if the land in question had been leased.
8. On 16 December 2020 the Prague 10 District Court, following four hearings and one inspection in situ, dismissed the applicant company’s action on the grounds, in particular, that the road had already existed when it had been owned by the state enterprise and that it was the only road enabling access to surrounding lands owned by other entities. Moreover, as the state enterprise had not objected when the road had started to be publicly used, it was assumed that the road had been created ex lege and that its legal status was binding on future owners who were not entitled to close it of their own motion. The road had become a publicly accessible purpose-built road before the applicant took ownership of the land and, therefore, its acquisition in 2002 came with this restriction already in place.
9. On 1 June 2021 the Prague Municipal Court upheld the aforesaid judgment. The court admitted that the Constitutional Court (II. ÚS 268/06 of 9 January 2008) had made it clear that the restriction of ownership rights, in the form of public access to land, could not be transferred to a new owner who acquired the land in restitution from a public corporation. It held, however, that this case-law did not apply to the present case, since the applicant company had acquired the plots of land in the public auction sale.
10. The applicant company challenged the lower courts’ approach in and assessment of his case – in particular the question of the transfer of the former owner’s consent to use the road - in its constitutional complaint, relying on Article 11 § 4 (mandatory limitation of property rights in the public interest, on the basis of law, and for compensation) and Article 36 § 1 (fair trial) of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
11. On 5 October 2021 the Constitutional Court (I. ÚS 2083/21) dismissed its constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded considering that the applicant’s objections were merely a polemic and a disagreement with the interpretation of domestic law and assessment of evidence by the ordinary courts, which had dealt with all its arguments and duly motivated their findings.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
12. The applicant company complained that the decision determining that a publicly accessible purpose-built road was situated on its plot of land constituted an interference with its property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, had not assessed its case in a manner compliant with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the complaints fall to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only.
13. The Government maintained that the applicant company had suffered no significant disadvantage. They further maintained that the domestic authorities had fully complied with their obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Insofar as their decisions declaring the existence of a purpose‑built road might be considered to constitute an “interference” with the applicant company’s property rights, in the Government’s view this was in the general interest and under conditions laid down by law, without a disproportionately onerous burden having been imposed on the applicant company.
14. The applicant company maintained its complaints.
15. The Court does not find it necessary to rule on the preliminary objection raised by the Government, since the applicant company’s complaints are in any event inadmissible for the reasons state below.
16. The Court accepts that the decision by which the administrative authority determined that the road through the applicant company’s property was a publicly accessible purpose-built road, and thus brought it within the legal framework which the applicant company was obliged to respect, could be considered as interference with the right to property falling within the control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It must therefore be examined whether it was in compliance with that Article – namely, whether it was lawful, pursued an aim in the general interest and whether a “fair balance” was struck between the general interest in question and the applicant company’s property rights (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, §§ 93-94, 25 October 2012).
17. The interference was in accordance with Czech law since it had a general basis in sections 7(1) and 19(1) of Law no. 13/1997 on terrestrial communications. The Court notes that the applicant company did not question these legal provisions in terms of their accessibility, clarity, and foreseeability. Rather, it complained of the manner in which its case was assessed by the domestic courts in the application of the relevant legal provisions and the national case-law.
18. The Court notes that the domestic courts established that the road through the applicant’s plot of land was the only means of access to the neighbouring lands, that the road had been in use since the 1970s to which the former owner had not objected. His consent was subsequently transferred to the applicant as the new owner. As to the applicant company’s argument that, according to the case-law of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 9 above), the consent to the public use of the road given by the former owner had not been transferred to it as the new owner of the property, the courts held that this case-law did not apply to the present case, since the applicant company had acquired the plots of land in the public auction sale and not through restitution procedure. Having regard to the information before it and considering that it has only limited power to deal with alleged errors of fact or law committed by the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I), the Court considers that it cannot substitute its view for that of the national courts, which does not appear unreasonable or manifestly arbitrary. It finds, therefore, that the interference with the applicant company’s property rights was a lawful consequence of the application of the relevant domestic provisions and domestic case-law, pursuing the legitimate public interest, namely the protection of the owners of plots of land adjacent to the land in question who, in the absence of the purpose-built road running through the land in question, would be unable to access their lands.
19. The Court therefore needs to examine whether a fair balance was struck between the legitimate aim and the applicant’s fundamental rights, and whether there were sufficient procedural guarantees in place.
20. The Court observes that the applicant purchased the property for business purposes in 2002. At the time of its acquisition, the road on the plot of land concerned had already been in existence and operating for decades (see paragraphs 2 and 4 above). As the Court has already pointed out, the administrative decision only legally classified the existing road which runs through the land. Accordingly, it would not be unreasonable to consider that the applicant company should have shown particular diligence before concluding the purchase contract to collect broader information concerning the character of the road, including to contact the local authority with a request for further details or documents regarding the premises in view of its specificities (see Marina Aucanada Group S.L. v. Spain, no. 7567/19, §§ 50‑53, 8 November 2022).
21. Nor can the Court overlook the fact that the price at which the applicant acquired the property in the public auction was only a fraction of the price established by the expert (see paragraph 5 above). Similarly, the area occupied by the road is a fraction of the total area of all the property acquired (see paragraphs 2 and 4 above). Although it is not clear from the documents before the Court how the applicant company has actually intended to dispose of its property, it cannot be excluded that its business use could, at least to some extent, compensate for the applicant company’s obligation to tolerate the publicly accessible purpose-built road on the plot of land in its ownership. The Court therefore does not find that the applicant company had to bear an excessive or disproportionate burden of the interference with its property rights.
22. The Court finally observes that the judicial review in the present case involved the courts at three levels of jurisdiction, including the Constitutional Court, and was fully adversarial. The applicant company was represented by a professional lawyer and its arguments were dully examined by the courts. The Court thus finds that there is nothing in the proceedings to suggest either that the applicant company was denied a reasonable opportunity to put forward its case or that the domestic courts’ findings were tainted with arbitrariness.
23. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 December 2024.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Section Registrar President
[1] The applicant company based its calculation on CZK 300 per metre square and per year.