applicant has not demonstrated that the refusal of the visit from Mr A was a restriction on his right to associate with the LHRO or that it hindered his ability to participate in the activities of that organization. 

2. The applicant also invoked Art 8 of the Convention, which provides: "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 

The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint primarily concerns the right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Art 8. The refusal of the prison authorities to allow Mr A to visit the applicant constitutes an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life. The Commission must therefore examine whether this interference was "in accordance with the law" and "necessary in a democratic society."

The Government has argued that the refusal was based on the relevant domestic law, specifically Rules 33 and 34 (8) of the Prison Rules 1964, which restrict visits to relatives and friends known to the prisoner prior to incarceration. The Commission acknowledges that the law must be sufficiently accessible and precise to enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions. In this case, the applicant was not informed of the specific advice given to prison governors regarding visits from individuals associated with the Church of Scientology, which raises concerns about the law's accessibility and clarity.

Furthermore, the Commission must assess whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society. The Government has expressed concerns about the potential harmful effects of the Church of Scientology's activities and the methods used by Mr A's committee. However, the applicant has argued that Mr A is a law-abiding citizen and a friend who has been in correspondence with him since the beginning of 1980. The Commission notes that the applicant has the right to maintain personal relationships, and the refusal of the visit appears to be a disproportionate response to the Government's concerns.

In conclusion, the Commission finds that the refusal of the prison authorities to allow Mr A to visit the applicant constitutes an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life under Art 8 of the Convention. This interference was not justified as being "in accordance with the law" or "necessary in a democratic society." 

The Commission therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Art 8 of the Convention. 

DECISION The Commission decides: 1. That the application is admissible; 2. That there has been a violation of Art 8 of the Convention. 

Done in Strasbourg, 8 October 1982.

The applicant was not barred from such membership or prevented from corresponding by the prison authorities. The Commission concludes that there was no interference with the applicant's freedom of association under Article 11 and that this part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention. 

2. The applicant's principal contention, however, is that visiting facilities for prisoners raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 

The applicant has contended that the refusal of the visit in question was in breach of his right to respect for private life. The Government submitted that there was no interference with this right, or, if there was, it was justified, being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health, and for the protection of the rights of others. 

The Commission considers that while detention, lawful under Article 5, is by its nature a limitation on private and family life, it is an essential part of a prisoner's right to respect for family life that prison authorities assist him in maintaining effective contact with his close family members. It is also an essential part of both private life and the rehabilitation of prisoners that their contact with the outside world be maintained as far as practicable, in order to facilitate their reintegration into society on release, and this is effected, for example, by providing visiting facilities for the prisoners’ friends and by allowing correspondence with them and others. 

As the Commission held in the case of X v Iceland (Application No 6825/74), the right to respect for private life "comprises also to a certain extent, the right to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfilment of one's own personality” (DR 5, p 86). However, it also has to be recognized that visiting facilities in prison create a heavy administrative and security burden for prison administration. It would not be feasible, therefore, to require that prisons provide unlimited visiting facilities to prisoners. A general limitation, with certain exceptions, to visits from relatives and close friends, appears, therefore, to be reasonable and consistent with the principles described above. 

As regards the facts of the present case, the Commission notes that the applicant commenced writing to Mr. A at the beginning of 1994, only a few months before requesting the visit. The purpose of the visit was to discuss medical records, apparently in furtherance of the aims of the applicant's and Mr. A's organization which, given their public character, is a campaign to arouse public opinion about prison medical treatment, and is not part of the applicant's private life. Thus, it cannot be said that the proposed meeting was to foster the applicant's personal relationship with Mr. A, who could only be described as an acquaintance of the applicant. Moreover, it is not disputed that the applicant was allowed to correspond freely with Mr. A, and he has not shown that he could not have dealt with the subject matter to be discussed during the proposed visit by letter. 

The Commission does not find that, in the circumstances of the present case, there has been an interference with the applicant's right to respect for private life. An examination of this part of the application does not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It follows that this aspect of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention. 

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. 

Secretary to the Commission  
Acting President of the Commission  
(H.C. KRUGER)  
(G. SPERDUTL)