that the term "everyone" includes the unborn. The Commission therefore concludes that the unborn child is not covered by the term "everyone" in Article 2 of the Convention.

8. The Commission further observes that the right to life, as enshrined in Article 2, is primarily concerned with the protection of individuals who have been born and are living. The legal framework surrounding abortion in the High Contracting Parties reflects a balance between the rights of the mother and the potential rights of the unborn child, which varies significantly across jurisdictions.

9. In light of the above considerations, the Commission finds that the applicant's complaints regarding the rights of the unborn child under Article 2 of the Convention do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the provisions of the Convention.

10. As for the applicant's claims under Articles 5, 6, 8, and 9, the Commission notes that these provisions primarily concern the rights of individuals who are already born and living. The applicant's assertion that he has been denied rights as a father does not establish a violation of these articles, as the legal framework in place does not recognize a father's right to prevent an abortion or to be consulted in the decision-making process regarding the termination of a pregnancy.

11. The Commission concludes that the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. 

12. For these reasons, the Commission decides to declare the application inadmissible. 

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative. 

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that it has any possible prenatal application, although such application in a rare case - e.g. under Art. 6 (1) - cannot be entirely excluded. 8. As regards, more particularly, Art. 2, it contains the following limitations of "everyone's" right to life enunciated in the first sentence of para. (1): - a clause permitting the death penalty in para. (1), second sentence: "No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law"; and - the provision, in para. (2), that deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of Art. 2 when it results from "the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary" in the following three cases: “in defence of any person from unlawful violence"; "in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained"; "in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection". All the above limitations, by their nature, concern persons already born and cannot be applied to the foetus. 9. Thus both the general usage of the term “everyone” ("toute personne") in the Convention (para. 7 above) and the context in which this term is employed in Art. 2 (para. 8 above) tend to support the view that it does not include the unborn. 10. The Commission has next examined, in the light of the above considerations, whether the term "life" in Art. 2 (1), first sentence, is to be interpreted as covering only the life of persons already born or also the "unborn life" of the foetus. The Commission notes that the term "life", too, is not defined in the Convention. 11. It further observes that another, more recent international instrument for the protection of human rights, the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, contains in Art. 4 (1), first and second sentences, the following provisions expressly extending the right to life to the unborn: “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.” The Commission notes that no such express extension is contained in Art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 12. The Commission is aware of the wide divergence of thinking on the question of where life begins. While some believe that it starts already with conception, others tend to focus upon the moment of nidation, upon the point that the foetus becomes "viable", or upon live birth. 13. The German Federal Constitutional Court, when interpreting the provision "Everyone has a right to life" in Art. 2 (2) of the Basic Law, stated as follows (judgment of 25 February 1975 - Appendix VI to the Commission's Report in the Brüggemann and Scheuten Case - C 11b of the grounds): “Life in the sense of the historical existence of a human individual exists according to established biological and physiological knowledge at least from the 14th day after conception (Nidation, Individuation) .... The process of development beginning from this point is a continuous one so that no sharp divisions or exact distinction between the various stages of development of human life can be made. It does not end at birth: for example, the particular type of consciousness peculiar to the human personality only appears a considerable time after the birth. The protection conferred by Art. 2 (2) first sentence of the Basic Law can therefore be limited neither to the 'complete' person after birth nor to the foetus capable of independent existence prior to birth. The right to life is guaranteed to everyone who ‘lives'; in this context no distinction can be made between the various stages of developing life before birth or between born and unborn children. ‘Everyone’ in the meaning of Art. 2 (2) of the Basic Law is ‘every living human being’, in other words: every human individual possessing life; ‘everyone' therefore includes unborn human beings." 14. The Commission also notes that, in a case arising under the Constitution of the United States (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113), the State of Texas argued before the Supreme Court that, in general, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy. The Court, while not resolving the difficult question of where life begins, found that, "with respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling' point is at viability". 15. The Commission finally recalls the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court mentioned at para. 6 above which, while also given in the framework of constitutional litigation, had to apply, like the Commission in the present case, Art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 16. The Commission considers with the Austrian Constitutional Court that, in interpreting the scope of the term "life" in Art. 2 (1), first sentence, of the Convention, particular regard must be had to the context of the Article as a whole. It also observes that the term "life" may be subject to different interpretations in different legal instruments, depending on the context in which it is used in the instrument concerned. 17. The Commission has already noted, when discussing the meaning of the term “everyone” in Art. 2 (para. 8 above), that the limitations, in paras. (1) and (2) of the Article, of "everyone's" right to "life", by their nature, concern persons already born and cannot be applied to the foetus. The Commission must therefore examine whether Art. 2, in the absence of any express limitation concerning the foetus, is to be interpreted: - as not covering the foetus at all; - as recognising a "right to life" of the foetus with certain implied limitations; or - as recognising an absolute "right to life" of the foetus. 18. The Commission has first considered whether Art. 2 is to be construed as recognising an absolute "right to life" of the foetus and has excluded such an interpretation on the following grounds. 19. The "life" of the foetus is intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman. If Art. 2 were held to cover the foetus and its protection under this Article were, in the absence of any express limitation, seen as absolute, an abortion would have to be considered as prohibited even where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman. This would mean that the “unborn life" of the foetus would be regarded as being of a higher value than the life of the pregnant woman. The "right to life" of a person already born would thus be considered as subject not only to the express limitations mentioned in para. 8 above but also to a further, implied limitation. 20. The Commission finds that such an interpretation would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention. It notes that, already at the time of the signature of the Convention (4 November 1950), all High Contracting Parties, with one possible exception, permitted abortion when necessary to save the life of the mother and that, in the meanwhile, the national law on termination of pregnancy has shown a tendency towards further liberalisation. 21. Having thus excluded, as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, one of the three different constructions of Art. 2 mentioned in para. 17 above, the Commission has next considered which of the two remaining interpretations is to be regarded as the correct one - i.e. whether Art. 2 does not cover the foetus at all or whether it recognises a "right to life" of the foetus with certain implied limitations. 22. The Commission here notes that the abortion complained of was carried out at the initial stage of the pregnancy - the applicant's wife was ten weeks pregnant - under Section 1 (1) (a) of the Abortion Act 1967 in order to avert the risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman. It follows that, as regards the second of the two remaining interpretations, the Commission is in the present case not concerned with the broad question of whether Art. 2 recognises a “right to life" of the foetus during the whole period of the pregnancy but only with the narrower issue of whether such a right is to be assumed for the initial stage of the pregnancy. Moreover, as regards implied limitations of a "right to life" of the foetus at the initial stage, only the limitation protecting the life and health of the pregnant woman, the so-called “medical indication", is relevant for the determination of the present case and the question of other possible limitations (ethic indication, eugenic indication, social indication, time limitation) does not arise. 23. The Commission considers that it is not in these circumstances called upon to decide whether Art. 2 does not cover the foetus at all or whether it recognises a "right to life" of the foetus with implied limitations. It finds that the authorisation, by the United Kingdom authorities, of the abortion complained of is compatible with Art. 2 (1), first sentence because, if one assumes that this provision applies at the initial stage of the pregnancy, the abortion is covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and health of the woman at that stage, of the “right to life" of the foetus. 24. The Commission concludes that the applicant's complaint under Art. 2 is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27 (2). 25. In its examination of the applicant's complaints concerning the Abortion Act 1967 and its application in this case, the Commission has next had regard to Art. 8 of the Convention which, in para (1), guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his family life. The Commission here notes, apart from his principal complaint concerning the permission of the abortion, the applicant's ancillary submission that the 1967 Act denies the father of the foetus a right to be consulted, and to make applications, about the proposed abortion. 26. The Commission also observes that the applicant, who under Art. 2 claims to be the victim of a violation of the right to life of the foetus of which he was the potential father, under Art. 8 invokes a right of his own. 27. As regards the principal complaint concerning the permission of the abortion, the Commission recalls that the pregnancy of the applicant's wife was terminated in accordance with her wish and in order to avert the risk of injury to her physical or mental health. The Commission therefore finds that this decision, insofar as it interfered in itself with the applicant's right to respect for his family life, was justified under para. (2) of Art. 8 as being necessary for the protection of the rights of another person. It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27 (2). 28. The Commission has next considered the applicant's ancillary complaint that the Abortion Act 1967 denies the father of the foetus a right to be consulted, and to make applications, about the proposed abortion. It observes that any interpretation of the husband's and potential father's right, under Art. 8 of the Convention, to respect for his private and family life, as regards an abortion which his wife intends to have performed on her, must first of all take into account the right of the pregnant woman, being the person primarily concerned in the pregnancy and its continuation or termination, to respect for her private life. The pregnant woman's right to respect for her private life, as affected by the developing foetus, has been examined by the Commission in its Report in the Brüggemann and Scheuten Case (loc. cit. paras. 59 et seq.). In the present case the Commission, having regard to the right of the pregnant woman, does not find that the husband's and potential father's right to respect for his private and family life can be interpreted so widely as to embrace such procedural rights as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be consulted, or a right to make applications, about an abortion which his wife intends to have performed on her. The Commission concludes that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Art. 27 (2). 29. The Commission does not find that any of the other provisions invoked by the applicant (Arts. 5, 6 and 9 of the Convention) are relevant for the examination of his complaints. For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE Head of Division replacing the Acting President of the Commission Secretary to the Commission (K. ROGGE) (C. A. NØRGAARD)