COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS  

DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY  

Application No. 6040/73 by J P B against Ireland  

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 20 July 1973, the following members being present:  
MM. J. E. S. FAWCETT, President  
G. SPERDUTI, Vice-President  
F. ERMACORA  
F. WELTER  
B. LINDAL  
B. DAVER  
J. OPSAHL  
K. MANGAN  
J. CUSTERS  
C. AYNZRGAARD  

Mr. A. B. McNULTY, Secretary to the Commission  

Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;  
Having regard to the application introduced on 12 February 1973 by J P B against Ireland and registered on 1 March 1973 under file No. 6040/73;  
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;  
Having deliberated,  

Decides as follows:  

The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarized as follows: On 12 February 1973 the applicant wrote to the Commission stating: "I am a citizen of the Irish Republic, my home address is 35 Windmill Road, Crumlin, Dublin 12, where my family at present reside. In July 1969 an attempt was made on my life by an illegal organisation (I.R.A.). I was shot in the back and leg; I managed to escape and was able to identify my attackers to the police authorities. Only one man was arrested and convicted; the other two escaped and are still free today. I have been under police protection since the above incident up to and including 22nd May 1972, on which date I left Ireland on business to London. On returning to Ireland to join my family for Christmas 1972, I was informed that I would no longer receive special police protection. For the past 3 1/2 years I have received special police protection in the form of a personal armed escort and a 24-hour uniformed police officer at my home up to the time I left Ireland in May of last year. I have been warned by the Chief Superintendent of the Special Branch that there was still a great danger to my life." He alleged the violation of Art. 2, Art. 5 (1), and Art. 14 of the Convention. He then continued: "I have requested the continuance of the protection which my family and I enjoyed over the past 3 1/2 years. The necessity of a personal bodyguard has been realized by the police authorities for the past 3 1/2 years. Due to the refusal of the police authorities to protect my life, I am forced to remain separate from my family. I plead that this court will take immediate steps to ease the sufferings of my family and me so that my family can live in peace and security. I wish to reiterate again, Sir, that in my humble opinion the above convention has been violated by the refusal of the Irish Police Authority to give my family and me protection."  

The applicant wrote the following further letter to the Commission on 6 July 1973: "My domestic situation has worsened so much that my wife now requires medical attention; consequently, my children are also suffering due to the fact that their mother is no longer able to cope with them. I plead, Sir, that you might bring my case to the immediate attention of the Commission under Rule 38 (1) that on humanitarian grounds the Commission might request the Irish Authorities as an interim measure to offer me the necessary protection so that I might visit my family for a maximum period of 7 days from the 21st July 1973 to the 28th July 1973, returning to London to await the hearing of my complete case. I respectfully submit, Sir, that if the Irish Authorities find that it is not convenient to offer me that protection for the 7 days, that they might finance my wife and three children so that they might visit me here in London during the above dates. I plead that my request might receive your immediate humanitarian and kind consideration."  

The applicant has complained that, although there is a great danger to his life in Ireland, the Irish authorities have refused him the continued protection of a personal bodyguard. He has alleged first that this refusal is in violation of Art. 2 of the Convention. It is true that Art. 2 provides that everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. However, the applicant has not even suggested that there are no laws in Ireland protecting the right to life, his complaint being simply that he personally has been refused a constant personal bodyguard. The Commission finds that Art. 2 cannot be interpreted as imposing a duty on a State to give protection of this nature, at least not for an indefinite period of time, which is what in effect the applicant requests.  

The applicant has alleged secondly that this refusal constitutes a breach of Art. 5 (1) of the Convention, which secures to everyone the right to security of person. The Commission has just found that Art. 2 does not impose a positive obligation on States to give individuals personal protection of the kind sought by the applicant. Similarly, it finds that neither can Art. 5 (1) be considered to impose on States such an obligation.  

An examination by the Commission of this complaint as it has been submitted does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and in particular in Arts. 2 and 5 (1). It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27 (2) of the Convention.  

The applicant has further complained that he has been separated from his family as a result of the refusal to give him protection. Since in some circumstances the unjustifiable separation of a person from other members of his family could constitute a violation of Art. 8 of the Convention, which guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his family life, the Commission has carried out an ex officio examination of this complaint under Art. 8. However, there is no indication at all that the Irish authorities have failed to respect the applicant's family life merely by reason of their refusal to give him the protection he requires. If neither Art. 2 nor Art. 5 (1) imposes a duty on a State to provide this protection, still less can it be argued that such a duty is imposed by virtue of Art. 8. An ex officio examination of this complaint under Art. 8 does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of the right guaranteed by this provision of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27 (2) of the Convention.  

The same ground of inadmissibility applies to the applicant's complaint that he has been the victim of a violation of Art. 14 of the Convention by reason of the failure to give him the protection he requires. Art. 14 provides that "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground...". The Commission has found in paragraphs 1 and 2 above that there is no appearance of a violation of the applicant's rights and freedoms guaranteed by Arts. 2, 5 (1), and 8 of the Convention. Similarly, there is no indication of a violation of any of these rights and freedoms if considered in conjunction with Art. 14 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.  

Secretary to the Commission  
President of the Commission  
(A.B. McNULTY)  
(J.E.S. FAWCETT)