FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 40034/20 Miroslav POKORNÝ against the Czech Republic The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 7 May 2025 as a Committee composed of: María Elósegui , President , Gilberto Felici, Kateřina Šimáčková , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 40034/20) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 2 September 2020 by a Czech national, Mr Miroslav Pokorný (“the applicant”), who was born in 1975, lives in Kostelec nad Černými lesy and was represented by Mr T. Kasal, a lawyer practising in Kolín; the decision to give notice of the application to the Czech Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1. The application concerns the dismissal of the applicant’s claim for disavowal of paternity in respect of two children born in wedlock in 2003 and 2008. The applicant relied on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. 2. The applicant is the legal father of two children born in wedlock in 2003 and 2008. After divorcing their mother in 2016, he exercised his contact rights in respect of the children and paid child maintenance. In October 2017 he made each child take a DNA test, which revealed that he was not their biological father. It appears from the case file that he informed the children of that fact and subsequently refused to see them. 3 . In February 2018, relying on Article 792 of the Civil Code, the applicant brought a claim for disavowal of paternity in respect of the two children. The relevant Article allowed the court to accept a claim challenging paternity even after the statutory time-limit had elapsed (six months from the moment when the person became aware of facts casting doubts on his paternity, and no later than six years after the child’s birth) if the child’s interests or considerations of public order so required. The applicant argued, inter alia , that his emotional ties to the children were broken, that it was important to him not to be considered their father and that their mother had prevented him from seeing them while insisting that he pay child maintenance. 4. The courts at two levels of jurisdiction dismissed the applicant’s claim, emphasising that he had cared for the children for fifteen and eleven years respectively, including following his divorce, and that their mother had refused to reveal the name of their biological father, with whom the children, at their age, would in any event no longer be able to form a relationship. The appellate court added that it was apparent from the children’s interview with their guardian ad litem that they still considered the applicant to be their father and wanted to see him, although their contact with him at that time had been affected by the results of the DNA tests and his insensitive attitude. Lastly, the court noted that the economic aspect could not be overlooked, given that the children’s mother had to care for two of the applicant’s other children, one of whom was disabled. 5. The courts thus considered that it was not in the best interests of the children for the applicant to challenge paternity after the expiry of the applicable time-limit, and that there were no considerations of public order in favour of doing so. Indeed, they held that the applicant’s objections that his ex-wife’s immoral behaviour should be condemned and that he did not want to pay child maintenance were of a subjective nature and did not render the current status quo unacceptable or contrary to fundamental values. 6. The Supreme Court declared an appeal on points of law by the applicant inadmissible, holding that the lower courts’ decisions were compliant with its case-law, according to which Article 792 of the Civil Code had to be applied only in exceptional cases in which the preservation of the prevailing state of affairs was so unacceptable to society that an interference with the child’s stable situation after the expiry of the statutory time-limit was justified. 7. By a decision of 23 June 2020 (no. I. ÚS 1449/20), the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant as manifestly ill ‑ founded. Reiterating that the child’s best interests were the primary criterion and could prevail over the parents’ interests, it observed that the continuation of legal paternity which did not correspond to biological reality did not necessarily amount to a violation of the legal father’s right to respect for his private and family life. The Constitutional Court held that, in the present case, the courts had duly examined the applicant’s arguments and explained why it was not in the interests of the minor children – who still considered the applicant their father – to accept the claim for disavowal of paternity. It further noted that the outcome of the proceedings could not be seen as condoning the conduct of the children’s mother, which had not been considered at all in the assessment of the children’s interests. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 8. The applicant complained, under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, that the courts had incorrectly assessed the interests at stake, and argued that not only his but also the children’s interests (namely, in having their biological father registered on their birth certificates) had been disrespected and that their mother’s immoral conduct had not been taken into account. 9. In the present case, the Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that all the complaints raised by the applicant fall to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention, which requires that the decision-making process leading to measures of interference be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by that provision. 10. The Court has previously accepted that the introduction of a time ‑ limit or other limitations on the institution of paternity proceedings may be justified by the desire to ensure legal certainty and finality in family relations and to protect the interests of the child (see, for example, Phinikaridou v. Cyprus , no. 23890/02, § 51, 20 December 2007; A.L. v. Poland , no. 28609/08, § 64, 18 February 2014; and R.L. and Others v. Denmark , no. 52629/11, § 40, 7 March 2017). 11. In this connection, the Court notes that the relevant Czech legislation had changed following the Constitutional Court’s plenary judgment no. Pl. ÚS 15/09, with the entry into force on 1 January 2014 of the new Civil Code (see Andrle v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 38633/08, 22 January 2013). Consequently, Article 792 of the new Civil Code enabled the applicant to have direct access to a court and to institute proceedings for disavowal of paternity even after the relevant statutory time-limit had elapsed (see paragraph 3 above, and compare Novotný v. the Czech Republic , no. 16314/13, § 46, 7 June 2018). 12. It is apparent from the case file and the parties’ observations that the Czech courts duly examined the applicant’s complaint. Applying the principles stemming from the Court’s case ‑ law, they carefully balanced the conflicting values and interests at stake and provided appropriate reasons for their findings. Indeed, the Court accepts that there are reasons of legal certainty and security of family relationships for States to apply a general presumption according to which a married man is regarded as the father of his wife’s children; it is also justifiable for domestic courts to give greater weight to the interests of the child and the family in which it lives than to the interest of an applicant in obtaining determination of a biological fact (see Nylund v. Finland (dec.), no. 27110/95, ECHR 1999-VI, and Marinis v. Greece , no. 3004/10, § 70, 9 October 2014) or, as in the present case, in bringing legal paternity into line with biological reality. 13. The Court is satisfied that the domestic courts, which had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, were guided primarily by the children’s best interests. In this respect, they emphasised that the children still considered the applicant to be their father, that he had provided them with parental care for a long time (see Marinis , cited above, § 71), that they were dependent on his child maintenance payments, and that they were in a situation where there was no chance of determining their biological father. The Court points out in this connection that when domestic authorities carefully assess the best interests of the child, the Court should not, in principle, contradict their findings, in particular if they are made by an independent court in judicial proceedings (see R.L. and Others v. Denmark , cited above, § 47). 14. However, it appears from the case file and, in particular, from the applicant’s observations that he was mainly motivated by a desire to punish what he saw as his ex-wife’s betrayal and by his unwillingness to bear the cost of child maintenance obligations, considerations that cannot prevail over the interests of the children. The Court further notes that the applicant lodged the application only on his own behalf, not on behalf of the children (compare R.L. and Others v. Denmark , cited above, §§ 1 and 38), which makes him unable to invoke their right to know their origins (see Andrle , cited above). 15. Lastly, the Court observes that, according to the domestic case-law submitted by the Government, a refusal to allow an exception to the time ‑ limit laid down by the Civil Code for a claim for disavowal of paternity does not have res judicata effect and that such a claim is more likely to be granted in respect of adult children who are no longer in need of special protection. 16. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 30 May 2025. Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President